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Contesting Expertise:  
Anthropologists at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
   
Gerhard Anders 
University of Edinburgh 
 
IN A FOOTNOTE: This article is based on fieldwork funded by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation. I am extremely grateful to the two anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments. Any errors and 
omissions are of course my responsibility. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines how social anthropologists’ expertise was employed in 
the international war crimes trials heard at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
It tracks how the anthropologists challenged the prosecution experts by 
raising concerns about their methodology and advancing a fundamental 
critique of abstract legal categories. The discussion between the experts 
centred on two contested issues: The character of the armed groups and the 
phenomenon of forced marriages during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The 
analysis of the experts’ testimonies shows that the anthropologists were 
engaged in an epistemological contest with the prosecution experts. The 
article aims at understanding why the anthropologists’ arguments had less 
resonance with the judges than the reports submitted by the prosecution 
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experts. Beyond the courtroom, it also speaks to the general debate about 
expertise and ways to study it. 
 
Introduction 
 
Anthropologists act as experts in a wide range of legal proceedings including 
indigenous rights claims (Clifford 1988; Paine 1996; Rosen 1977; Thuen 
2004) and asylum cases (Good 2004; 2007; 2008). This article presents an 
analysis of anthropologists as experts in a new legal arena, international war 
crimes trials, where the debate about the nature of anthropological expertise 
and its relation with the law and other bodies of knowledge plays out. 
Specifically, it examines the testimony by two anthropologists who were 
called by defence counsel to rebut the reports submitted by prosecution 
experts in the trials heard at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).  
 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is an international criminal tribunal set up 
as ‘sui generic independent institution’ seated in Freetown that was set up by 
an agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra 
Leone in 2002 following Security Council Resolution 1315. It has the 
mandate to try to those ‘bearing the greatest responsibility’ for crimes against 
humanities and war crimes committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone 
between November 1996 and 2002. The court is a so-called hybrid court 
since it applies both international and national law and a minority of the 
judges is appointed by the government of Sierra Leone. The court has two 
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trial chambers (with three judges each, two appointed by the UN Secretary 
General and one by the government of Sierra Leone) and one appeals 
chamber (with five judges, three appointed by the UN Secretary General and 
two by the government).    
 
 
Because of the court’s limited mandate only a small number of individuals 
have been indicted and tried. The indictments focused on the alleged leaders 
of the various warring factions. In 2003, the prosecutor indicted 13 men of 
which 11 have stood trial. Two of them have died of natural causes in the 
court’s custody. These were tried in four separate trials with three accused 
each in three trialsi and one accused, Charles Taylor, in the fourth trial. At the 
time of writing in February 2014, all trials had been concluded. The Special 
Court has a remarkable rate of convictions, all the accused who stood trial 
were found guilty and sentenced to long prison sentences.  
 
 
The reports submitted by these experts and the evidence they gave in court is 
of particular interest for anthropologists. The rapidly expanding field of 
international criminal justice has resulted in a growing demand for 
anthropological expertise (Eltringham 2013; Wilson 2011). This is likely to 
increase further due to the International Criminal Court’s focus on sub-
Saharan Africa and the prominence of anthropologists in African studies. It is 
therefore important to discuss the challenges and experiences of 
anthropologists who testified before international criminal tribunals. Beyond 
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the courtroom, the present analysis also speaks to the wider debate about 
expertise and how it can be studied from a social-scientific perspective (Carr 
2010; Collins and Evans 2007; Jasanoff 1995; 2003). 
 
 
This article adds a new perspective to the debate about anthropologists as 
experts. In the literature, there is a tendency to emphasise fundamental 
epistemological differences, and as a consequence, incommensurability  
between the law, on the one hand, and anthropological knowledge production, 
on the other (Alvarez and Loucky 1992; Campisi 1991; Clifford 1988; 
Holden 2011; Kandel 1992a; Rigby and Sevareid 1992; Rosen 1977; Thuen 
2004). Recently, several studies of asylum cases (Good 2004; 2007; 2008) 
and international war crimes trials (Eltringham 2013; Wilson 2011) have 
examined more closely the role played by anthropologists and historians in 
the strategies of the parties calling them as experts. This shift in emphasis to 
the strategies pursued in court brings the epistemological contest between 
different types of expertise and their role in legal fact-finding in focus. 
 
 
In the trials heard at the Special Court, the anthropologists who were called 
as experts were asked to address the importance of certain aspects of socio-
cultural life during the civil war in Sierra Leone. It is significant that both 
anthropologists were called by the defence to rebut the prosecution experts’ 
reports. The judges, however, refused to adopt the anthropologists’ 
arguments and did not share their concerns about the methodology and 
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conceptual framework employed by the prosecution experts, a military 
officer and a civil rights activist. This was, this article will argue, due to 
universalistic assumptions and categories shared by the prosecution experts 
and the judges who were reluctant to recognize the challenge posed by Sierra 
Leone’s socio-cultural specificities to the application of international criminal 
law. 
 
 
This article will first situate the debate between the experts at the Special 
Court in relation to the literature on anthropological and historical expertise 
in court. It is a piece of courtroom ethnography based on direct observation 
of Hoffman’s testimony, a close reading of the transcripts as well as 
interviews with Hoffman, Thorsen, the prosecutor, the defence lawyers and 
one of the judges. The first part of the analysis examines the discussion about 
the methodology employed by prosecution and defence experts. The second 
part focuses on the anthropologists’ attempts to expose the universalistic and 
simplistic assumptions informing the prosecution experts’ reports. The third 
part discusses the impact of the experts’ testimony on the judgements and 
discusses its implications for anthropologists in international war crimes 
trials and the current debate on expertise in the social sciences. 
 
 
Uneasy Fact-finding: Anthropologists as Experts 
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The discussion on anthropologists as experts in trials, both criminal and civil, 
has mainly centred on the question whether anthropological knowledge 
production can be adapted to legal fact-finding. According to Rosen, ‘there 
are few roles that confront conscientious anthropologists with more serious 
scholarly and ethical problems than those posed by their appearance in legal 
proceedings as expert witnesses’ because ‘the expert witness is brought, 
usually by one of the adversary parties, into a legal proceeding whose form 
and goals often appear foreign, if not overtly antithetical, to scholarly 
capacities and purposes’ (Rosen 1977: 555). Clifford (1988) describes how 
scholars called as experts are compelled to abide by the law’s strict binary 
logic employed to establish legal facts and arrive at legal decisions. They 
were pressed ‘for sharp, unambiguous opinions’ (1988: 318) and provide 
clear ‘yes or no’ answers (1988: 321). This is said to run counter to 
anthropological knowledge production, which is more concerned with 
explaining socio-cultural realities and structures shaping human agency 
rather than ascribing individual responsibility or liability (cf. Kandel 1992a). 
 
 
This unease with the logic of the trial and the law are by no means unique to 
anthropologists. Historians who testify in criminal and civil cases have 
expressed similar concerns arising from epistemological and methodological 
differences (Evans 2002). At international criminal tribunals, Wilson shows 
how experts often have grappled with the challenges of presenting 
multifaceted histories in the setting of a trial where they are exposed to cross-
examination and pressed for unequivocal statements (Wilson 2011: 202-206). 
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Confronted with fundamental epistemological and methodological 
differences historians such as Rousso (2002), a French historian who refused 
to testify as expert in the trial against Maurice Papon, deem historiography to 
be utterly unsuitable to legal fact-finding and, consequently, refuse to act as 
expert witnesses (Rousso 2002: 86). 
 
 
However, Rousso’s position is not widely shared by social scientists and 
historians. Evans (2002), for instance, takes issue with Rousso and makes a 
case for the use of historical expertise in criminal and civil trials. Evans, who 
acted as expert in the libel case of David Irving, points out that historians can 
help the courts by providing expertise the lawyers cannot be expected to 
possess. In contrast to Rousso, Evans highlights ways in which historians can 
benefit from the courts’ directions that might push their research in new, 
promising areas (Evans 2002: 343-344).  
 
 
This view is shared by the anthropologists writing on the subject such as 
Rosen (1977) and Good (2004; 2007) who argue that anthropologists’ 
expertise can assist in the courts’ fact-finding exercise and – eventually – in 
achieving justice. Awareness of the risks and challenges associated with 
inserting their knowledge into the adversarial dynamic of legal proceedings 
are seen as crucial for the efficacy of the anthropologist as expert. Without a 
clear idea of what is expected and what is possible in the setting of the 
courtroom the expert is likely to have a frustrating experience and waste an 
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opportunity to help the court. This position is supported by Wilson’s (2011) 
recent study of historians’ expert testimony in international war crimes trials. 
He shows how historians who were called as experts at the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) were employed 
in the strategies of the prosecution and the defence. He tracks how ‘historical 
evidence has become an integral part of prosecution and defence cases’ 
(Wilson 2011: 218) and, consequently, relativizes the importance of the 
epistemological divide between social science and historiography, on the one 
hand, and legal reasoning in court, on the other. A similar argument is made 
by Eltringham (2013), who points out that those who acted as experts at the 
ICTR did not consider the epistemological and methodological differences 
between law and anthropology to constitute an insurmountable obstacle. The 
debate between the anthropologists and the prosecution experts at the Special 
Court paints a different picture. Here, the anthropologists hoped to educate 
the judges by raising fundamental epistemological and methodological 
concerns but failed to make an impact on the judges who found the expertise 
offered by other experts more conveniently corresponding to their legal 
epistemology. 
 
 
In the four trials heard at the Special Court between 2004 and 2013, 13 
experts submitted reports. 10 of them were called to testify in court although 
two did do so in closed session.ii The experts included one forensic expert, 
four military officers, one member of a UN-Panel of Experts, two 
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representatives of non-governmental organisations, one historian and three 
anthropologists. The prosecution called the forensic expert, two of the 
military officers, the member of the UN panel of Experts, the historian and 
the two NGO representatives whereas the defence called the other two 
military officers and the anthropologists. My analysis focuses on the 
testimony of the two anthropologists who submitted reports and testified in 
court (one anthropologist submitted a report for the defence but he was no 
called to testify) as well as the prosecution experts whose testimony they 
sought to rebut. The following questions will guide my analysis: How did 
they seek to establish their authority as experts? What were the arguments 
they advanced? Did they assist the judges in their task? The underlying 
question is whether anthropological arguments were deemed useful by the 
court.  
 
 
Expert witnesses at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The two anthropologists who testified were both called by the defence to 
rebut the testimony of two experts called by the prosecution. Dr. Danny 
Hoffman, an American anthropologist, acted as expert witness in the trial 
against three leaders of the Civil Defence Force (CDF), a pro-government 
ethnic militia also known as kamajors that fought against the rebels of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), a group of renegade soldiers that had toppled the 
democratically elected government in 1997 and formed an alliance with the 
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RUF. He wrote a report on the structure of the CDF and testified on 9 and 10 
October 2006. He was called to rebut the testimony of Colonel Richard Iron, 
an expert on military doctrine called by the prosecution, who had concluded 
that the various armed groups during the civil war in Sierra Leone constituted 
military or paramilitary organizations. 
 
 
Dr. Dorte Thorsen, an anthropologist from the Nordic Africa Institute in 
Uppsala, was called by the defence in the trial against three leaders of the 
AFRC who were accused of committing countless atrocities against the 
civilian population. Her report was filed by the defence on 26 July 2006. She 
testified in open session on 24 and 25 October 2006. Thorsen was called to 
challenge the testimony of prosecution expert Zainab Bangura, a Sierra 
Leonean civil rights activist, who had submitted a report on the ‘bush wife’ 
phenomenon. Bangura’s report was disclosed on 6 July 2005 and she testified 
in open session between 3 and 5 October 2005.  
 
 
Contested expertise 
 
The first hurdle a prospective expert witness has to take is whether he or she 
is recognized by the court as expert. In general, an expert witness is defined 
in terms of a specific knowledge acquired through experience, training or 
education to assist the court in assessing the evidence or determine the facts 
(Good 2007; Jasanoff 1995; Kandel 1992b: 56). The Special Court’s judges 
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defined an expert witness as a ‘person whom by virtue of some specialised 
knowledge, skill or training can assist the trier of fact to understand or 
determine an issue in dispute’ (SCSL 2005a: 4). In the trials heard at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone expert witnesses were called by the parties to 
support their theory of what the case is about or the assessment of the 
relevant facts. This is due to the adversarial system used in international 
criminal trials and Common Law jurisdictions where the parties are the 
masters of the trial and the judges adopt a fairly passive role.  
 
 
In the trials heard at the Special Court it was common to challenge the 
credentials of expert witness called by the opposing side. The defence 
doubted the qualifications of the prosecution experts. The prosecutors, in turn, 
expressed doubts with regard to the qualifications of Hoffman and Thorsen. 
This is not unusual, in particular with regard to an adversary trial where 
experts are brought in by the parties rather than the court. International 
criminal law, as a fairly young field, does not yet have the consolidated body 
of precedents and regulations or clearly established professional associations 
(Wilson 2011: 221-222) found in national legal systems (cf. Good 2007: 140; 
Jasanoff 1995: 57- 61). Following the other international tribunals the judges 
at the Special Court adopted a quite extensive interpretation of the term 
‘expert’ and rejected only one expert, Corinne Dufka in the trial against 
Taylor, because of lack of expertise although they admitted her testimony as 
witness of fact (SCSL 2008a).  
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Danny Hoffman, then assistant professor at the University of Washington in 
Seattle, is specialised in the anthropology of violence and warfare, African 
affairs and visual anthropology. He received his PhD in 2004 from Duke 
University for a thesis on the Kamajor movement in Sierra Leone, where he 
had carried out extensive fieldwork between 2000 and 2003. Hoffman was 
called by defence counsel of the second accused, Moinina Fofana, to rebut 
Colonel Iron’s report. Iron, a Colonel in the British Army, had concluded that 
the kamajors, an ethnic militia that fought in the civil war in Sierra Leone, 
did constitute a military organisation. This finding was a necessary pre-
requisite for the prosecution’s charge that the accused, who were leaders of 
this militia, had exercised command responsibility as senior commanders and 
were therefore directly responsible for war crimes committed by members of 
the kamajors, also known as Civil Defence Forces (CDF).  
 
 
The Kamajors, hunters in Mende, were a response to the threat posed by the 
RUF in the Mende-areas in the country’s southeast. In 1991, the RUF had 
started a guerrilla war against the government in Freetown. The kamajors and 
other self-defence groups replaced the army, which proved unable to provide 
the necessary protection and, in fact, terrorized the population they were 
supposed to protect. In the mid-1990s, an alliance of Mende politicians, 
traditional leaders and the government of Sierra Leone coordinated the 
Kamajors and self-defence groups from other ethnic groups to establish the 
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CDF under the leadership of Sam Hinga Norman, a Mende chief (Hoffman 
2007). 
 
 
During the civil war, the fighters of the CDF were accused of committing war 
crimes and human rights violations. These allegations were the foundation 
for the indictment against three leaders of the CDF and the trial against Sam 
Hinga Norman, National Coordinator of the CDF, Moinina Fofana, the 
‘Director of War’, and Allieu Kondewa, the Kamajor ‘High Priest’. The trial 
lasted from March 2004 till August 2007 and ended with the conviction of 
the second and third accused for war crimes. This judgement was confirmed 
by the appeals chamber. The first accused, Norman, had died before the 
judgement was handed down in custody while undergoing medical treatment 
in Dakar in February 2006. The most contentious issue in the trial was 
whether the accused could be held responsible for acts committed by 
members of the CDF. 
 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had charged the three accused for war 
crimes because they allegedly held positions of superior responsibility and 
exercised command and control over their subordinates (Art. 6(3) Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone). The exercise of effective command 
responsibility presupposes the existence of a military or civilian organisation 
including chain of command and internal coherence. The CDF was, 
according to the OTP, an irregular military force which exhibited most of the 
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characteristics of an army albeit in rudimentary form. The defence attorneys 
disputed this and argued instead that the accused never exercised effective 
command and control because the CDF did not constitute a military 
organisation. 
 
 
OTP called Colonel Richard Iron as expert witness. At the time Iron was the 
British liaison officer in NATO’s Allied Command Transformation unit. 
Prior to that he had served as the head of the British Army’s Doctrine Branch 
in the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine. In addition to 
extensive experience in evaluating the conduct of conventional forces he was 
an expert on non-conventional warfare (SCSL 2005b: 14-17). His report 
addressed four questions: The first one was whether the CDF had a military 
hierarchy and structure; the second one whether the CDF exhibited the 
characteristics of a military organisation; the third one whether it was a 
coherent organisation and the fourth whether command was effective. 
Colonel Iron answered all these questions in the affirmative in his report and 
testimony given before the court on 14 June 2005. In order to refute Colonel 
Iron’s report the defence attorneys brought Dr. Hoffman who, in turn, wrote a 
report examining the structure of the CDF. In this report he concluded that 
the CDF was not a military organisation.  
 
 
The contents of Hoffman’s report will be discussed at length in the second 
part of this piece. Here I want focus on the doubts raised by the prosecutor 
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regarding Hoffman’s expertise and methodology. When Hoffman took the 
witness stand on 9 October 2006 the prosecutor Kamara raised an objection 
against his report on the grounds that Hoffman was not qualified to give his 
opinion since he was not a ‘military expert’ but merely an anthropologist.   
 
 
MR KAMARA (the prosecutor): My Lord, he’s not qualified to 
proffer that opinion, because he’s here before the court as an expert in 
anthropology.  
PRESIDING JUDGE: Cultural anthropology. 
MR KAMARA: Yes, My Lord. Cultural anthropology. 
PRESIDING JUDGE: Don’t narrow it down. 
MR KAMARA: Yes, My Lord, cultural anthropology, and there is 
evidence before this court, that has been adduced by a military expert. 
It is not for this witness to come to this court as a cultural 
anthropologist to comment and evaluate the evidence of that military 
expert. 
PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The question I put now is: For me to be 
enlightened, why is the subject that he’s purporting to proffer an 
opinion on not a proper subject for cultural anthropology? 
MR KAMARA: My Lord, it could be a proper subject for cultural 
anthropology, but where evidence has been adduced before this Court 
by a military expert, it cannot come in the disguise of a cultural 
anthropologist to evaluate and assess the value of that evidence. 
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PRESIDING JUDGE: That is the difficulty of your position. You 
cannot, as a lawyer, merely from that podium, make a pronouncement 
that his particular area of study is an area which does not fall within 
the disciplinary scope of cultural anthropology, but within the scope 
of military science, unless you can produce evidence to counter that. 
It seems as if you’re asking us to take your own ipse dixit on this, 
which is a very controversial issue. 
… 
JUDGE BOUTET: And why is it an anthropologist cannot speak 
about war, the consequences of war and implications of war, as such? 
Why is it you seem to imply in your objection that only military 
people can speak about that? Why is it? Is it an exclusive domain of 
the military? (SCSL 2006a: 43-44) 
 
 
This exchange nicely illustrates that the epistemological contest in court did 
not play out between anthropologists and the law but rather between different 
types of expertise, here juxtaposed by the prosecutor. The exchange between 
the prosecutor and the judges highlights the role of the parties in employing 
expert knowledge against their opponent and the judges’ role as judicial 
gatekeepers who decide over admissibility and weight, i.e. relevance, of the 
expert testimony. It also hints probably at the judges’ limited knowledge over 
anthropology or rather cultural anthropology. It is quite common for lawyers 
to have not a very clear idea of social and cultural anthropology, as Sapignoli 
shows in her analysis of an anthropologist who acted as expert witness in 
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Botswana (Sapignoli 2008). She and Good (2007) show that lawyers tend to 
imagine social and cultural anthropology as empiricist, value-free and 
objective, a perception often promoted by experts themselves, as Good (2007: 
130) notes. 
 
 
In cross-examination the prosecutor tried to discredit Hoffman’s report 
because of the intimate relationships he developed with kamajors with whom 
he had lived together at the Brookfields Hotel in Freetown, a kamajor 
‘barracks’.  
 
 
MR KAMARA: So, for the most part, Dr. Hoffman, during that 
period, your observations of the Kamajors was from the balcony of 
room 312? 
WITNESS: I am not sure I’d characterise it that way, no. I would also 
point out this was a room shared by six combatants, so it’s not as 
though I were there alone. 
… 
JUDGE ITOE: Dr. Hoffman, are you saying you shared the room at 
Brookfields Hotel with six Kamajors? 
WITNESS: Right. There were – the room – when I stayed, when I 
spent the nights at Brookfields, I stayed in this room 312 A, room 312, 
which was block A. It was a room that was occupied – the numbers 
tended to vary. There were probably four people that were prime 
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residents there. A number of people floated in and out. So, I usually 
approximated it as being six people. The distinction here is that this is 
participant-observation research. This is anthropological work where 
my fieldwork involves living with people on a day-to-day basis. And, 
as I was researching the Kamajors obviously, this was the place to do 
it (SCSL 2006a: 127). 
 
 
It is clear from this exchange that the prosecutor intended to demonstrate that 
participant observation creates a bias on part of the researcher in favour of his 
research subjects. Hoffman, in turn, played out the anthropological trump 
card, the long period of close contact with the research subjects. He had done 
extensive research in Sierra Leone since 2000, conducted interviews with 
approximately 200 individuals and had lived in close social interaction with 
kamajors. In April 2006, he came back to collect more material for the report 
he was asked to write (Hoffman 2006: 5).  
 
 
Dr. Dorte Thorsen from the Nordic Africa Institute testified in the trial 
against three leaders of the AFRC. She received her PhD in African Studies 
from the University of Sussex in 2005. Her research has focused on women 
in Burkina Faso where has carried out anthropological fieldwork since 1997. 
She was called by the defence to rebut an expert witness report written by 
Zainab Bangura, a Sierra Leonean women’s rights activist. The defence 
lawyers had raised objections against Mrs. Bangura’s report arguing it failed 
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to meet the standards of an expert report because it was unscientific and 
exclusively based on Bangura’s personal experience. Their objection was 
overruled by the judges who admitted Bangura’s report into evidence. To 
challenge Bangura’s report the defence attorneys asked Thorsen to write an 
expert report on ‘forced marriages’ in West Africa.  
 
 
The indictment against three leaders of the AFRC, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima 
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, listed several counts of sexual 
violence and other inhumane acts (counts 6-9) including ‘forced marriages’. 
OTP defined ‘forced marriage’ as an inhumane act by which girls and women 
were abducted and forced into marriages as so-called bush wives. According 
to the indictment, ‘the “wives” were forced to perform a number of conjugal 
duties under coercion by their “husbands”’. Bangura’s report dealt with what 
she referred to ‘the bush-wife phenomenon’ perpetrated by combatants of the 
AFRC and RUF. According to Bangura, the AFRC and the RUF abducted 
many girls and women and declared them their wives against the will of the 
girls and women who faced gang rape, deprivation and death if they refused 
to ‘marry’ the combatants. Many of these unions had offspring and often the 
women would stay with their ‘husbands’ for years and after the end of the 
war. In her report Bangura pointed out that being a ‘bush wife’ carried a 
social stigma since these women were not properly married according to 
custom (Bangura 2005).  
 
 
  20 
Both anthropologists explicitly criticised the reports of the expert witnesses 
called by the prosecution. They took issue with the other experts’ 
methodology and theoretical framework. 
 
  
WITNESS [Dr. Hoffman]: I have read Colonel Iron’s report, 
obviously. I would generally categorise my concerns along three lines. 
And those would be first, methodological; second, empirical and third, 
theoretical or conceptual, and there are particulars within each of 
those. But, very briefly, methodologically, I am concerned with the 
very limited number of people spoken to and their location and 
position within the CDF, and concerned about the very limited 
amount of time that was spent in preparation for that report. As, 
hopefully, it has become clear from the report and testimony I have 
been giving, there are a lot of social nuances that are incredibly 
important for understanding the dynamics of the CDF which you just 
– nobody could possibly pick up talking to seven people over I 
believe it’s 14 days (SCSL 2006a: 110-111). 
 
 
Colonel Iron was a trained civil engineer and a Sandhurst-trained career 
soldier in the British army who saw active duty in Bosnia and served in a 
number of staff functions in the British Ministry of Defence and NATO. 
During his oral testimony on 14 June 2005 he said he could not rely only on 
secondary sources and had ‘to go out on the ground’ to verify information 
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from his interlocutors or ‘sources’ and the written documents he had 
consulted. In fact, Iron had visited a couple of sites in Sierra Leone and 
interviewed nine men (not seven as Hoffman claimed) during a 14-day period. 
From the perspective of a military man this might be a perfectly sound 
method but it did not meet the standards applied to anthropological fieldwork, 
as Hoffman pointed out. 
 
 
Thorsen had similar criticisms with regard to Bangura’s report. She pointed 
out that Bangura had merely collected statements of women who allegedly 
were ‘bush wives’ without giving background information or providing the 
socio-cultural background against which these statements should be placed. 
 
 
PROSECUTOR: …did you consult the report of Mrs Bangura? 
WITNESS: I read the report. I found it very flawed on the 
methodological issues and I found that the quotes she gives in her 
report, it talks a lot about the circumstances of these – well not even 
circumstances – it tells a lot about – that women were abducted and 
that they were being coerced into being bush wives and that they left 
or stayed with the husband after the war. But inasmuch as she didn’t 
analyse her data, inasmuch as she didn’t discuss it but left it to speak 
on its own, it is actually very difficult to know what she wanted to say 
with this material. And also, she does not contextualise the whole 
situation of these women and she collected the data from a large 
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amount of regions. How can we know that everything is the same in 
those regions? There is a lack of contextualisation. 
 
 
For Hoffman and Thorsen the methodology used by Iron and Bangura did not 
meet the norms for scholarly research. Both of them criticized the lack of 
‘social nuances’ (Hoffman) and ‘contextualisation (Thorsen) in the 
prosecution experts’ testimony. The next part will examine in more detail 
how the anthropologists rebutted the testimony of the prosecution experts. 
 
 
The anthropological perspective 
 
Anthropologists writing about international criminal justice (Eltringham 2013; 
Wilson 2011) emphasise the salience of the trial strategies of the prosecution 
and defence with regard to the analysis of expert testimony in international 
war crimes trials. Eltringham takes issue with the idea of an ‘epistemological 
confrontation’ (Thuen 2004: 266) and argues that the historians and 
anthropologists who testified at the ICTR did not consider themselves to be 
‘engaged in an epistemological contest with the law’ (Eltringham 2013: 338). 
To some degree this finding is backed up by my evidence from the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone where the anthropologists did indeed submit nuanced 
and detailed reports. Both, however, did consider themselves to be engaged 
in an epistemological and methodological confrontation – albeit with the 
prosecution experts rather than the Law.  
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Both, Hoffman and Thorsen heavily criticized the ethnocentric and normative 
assumptions underlining the prosecution theories of the military structure of 
the kamajors and ‘forced marriage’. They insisted on contextualised and 
nuanced representations and eschewed sweeping general conclusions, 
drawing attention to complexity and contingency. That was the very reason 
why they were called by defence counsel who was at pains to show that the 
realties in during the civil war in Sierra Leone were more complex and 
dynamic than the prosecution theory of clear-cut criminal responsibility 
suggested.  
 
 
In the CDF-trial Hoffman took issue with the idea of the CDF as a 
hierarchical and coherent military organization over which the accused 
exercised effective command and control. From his perspective, the CDF 
constituted ‘a loosely organized militarized social network without a 
centralized military command structure’ (Hoffman 2006: 4). Hoffman 
contradicted Colonel Iron’s report on a number of factual issues. For example, 
Iron describes a base, which was known as Base Zero, in terms of a military 
headquarter where combatants would receive military training, obviously an 
important aspect of the prosecution’s theory of the case against the leaders of 
the CDF. Hoffman criticized this representation of Base Zero during his 
examination in court. 
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WITNESS: I think training is one of the things that’s going on there. 
It is sporadic. There is a mention in Colonel Iron’s report about this 
intensive two-week training course, as though you were going to Fort 
Benning in Georgia, and receiving your officer training. It’s just not 
the way I would characterise what was going on there. It is more 
sporadic than that and it’s only one of the many, many functions that 
is taking place. The concerns at Base Zero were a bit more mundane 
than that; providing food, for example, that kind of things (SCSL 
2006a: 74). 
 
 
Another central element in the prosecution’s case was the existence of a 
hierarchy and a chain of command in the CDF. Colonel Iron confirmed this 
view in his report and during his testimony. By contrast, Hoffman denied the 
existence of a centralised command structure and sketched a more 
polycentric, highly dynamic structure with little internal coherence and no 
real chain of command. Hoffman based his interpretation of the CDF as 
militarized web of social relations on the scholarly debate on the prevalence 
of patron/client relationships in African societies, a point which was missed 
both in the prosecution’s case and Iron’s expert witness report. The defence 
lawyers sought to emphasize this interpretation when they questioned 
Hoffman in court as the next quote illustrates. 
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MR POWLES (defence lawyer): How relevant is that concept of 
patronage to the Kamajor/CDF structures? 
WITNESS: My Lords, I think it’s as central to the Kamajors and CDF 
as it is to everyday life in the Mende communities, which is to say 
that it is foundational (SCSL 2006a: 102).   
 
 
From Hoffman’s perspective, the importance of patronage in understanding 
the CDF lend support to his argument that the CDF was a ‘militarized social 
network’ without clear hierarchies. In line with recent studies on the role of 
youth in African armed conflicts (Peters and Richards 1998; Utas 2003; West 
2000) Hoffman argued that the war offered many disenfranchised young 
people an avenue for social advancement. This was facilitated because the 
patronage system had become more volatile and hence more permeable due 
to the civil war. In this context it was frequently not a leader who appointed 
individuals to positions of authority but rather enterprising individuals who 
tried to assume positions of authority by acquiring clients and declaring 
themselves ‘commanders’ as Hoffman pointed out. 
 
 
MR POWLES: You talk of titles in your report, and you mention of 
course the meaning of the term “commander”; what is the meaning of 
the term “commander”? 
WITNESS: My Lords, I think one of the dynamics that happened 
within this, the conflict, is that the term “commander” essentially 
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became a synonym, if you will, of the term “patron”. That was – the 
implication in the term “commander” was that this was the kind of 
relationship that was being pointed to. 
MR POWLES: How would one get such a title? 
WITNESS: Well, for one thing, through the accumulation of clients, 
but there were also a number of people, and again, this goes back to 
this idea of experimentation, there is a fair amount of, if you will, 
bravado in this. Individuals staking a claim to certain positions of 
authority and, if you will, seeing if making that claim is enough in 
itself to attract people… (SCSL 2006a: 104). 
 
 
Hoffman emphasised that titles like ‘commander’, although they mimicked 
military ranks, had a different meaning in the context of the civil war in 
Sierra Leone. 
 
 
MR POWLES: If a title was in the English language, to what extent 
would the majority of Kamajors be able to understand the meaning of 
that title? 
WITNESS: What most people would understand by titles that are in 
English is that they are titles of importance. They would not, 
necessarily, and, in fact, most cases would not be able to say “Okay, 
this title corresponds to this, it entails this responsibility.” What it 
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evokes, what titles in English evoke… is a sense of authority (SCSL 
2006a: 106).  
 
 
While listening to the anthropologist’s nuanced and contextualised 
description of the CDF’s organisation it occurred to me that his account in 
many ways resembled those by anthropologists in native title claims in the 
US. Under US law an indigenous group first had to prove its continued 
existence as ‘tribe’ before it could lay claim to a specific territory. In legal 
terms a ‘tribe’ was contingent upon several features that bore only little 
resemblance to actual social organisation of Native American groups and 
rather reflected European ideas about these ‘savage’ and ‘state-less’ societies. 
Anthropologists on the plaintiffs’ side often criticised concepts such as ‘tribe’ 
or ‘land ownership’ as too simplistic and static. They pointed out that 
indigenous identity did not necessarily depend on the existence of ‘tribal’ 
institutions or customs. Clifford’s (1988) ethnography is a good example of 
these debates on indigenous identity in the courtroom. Just as the Jack 
Campisi, the anthropologist who acted as expert witness for the Mashpee 
Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., tried to show that the history of Native 
Americans was not a simple story of either survival or assimilation Danny 
Hoffman tried to show that the Kamajors were in fact a much more complex 
and contradictory phenomenon than the prosecution assumed, a fluid 
militarized social movement that provided opportunities for gain and 
advancement rather than a centralized military organization described by the 
prosecution and Colonel Iron.    
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The question whether the CDF constituted a military organization can be read 
as an inversion of the central question in the Mashpee-case described by 
Clifford (1988). In that case, the plaintiff, the Wampanoag Tribal Council, 
Inc. was at pains to prove that the Mashpee community had been governed as 
an Indian tribe since only recognized tribes could file claims for land 
restitution under US law. In both cases the main issue was whether an 
organized group existed but whilst the Mashpee had to qualify as a tribe to 
have legal standing in a civil law suit over compensation for the loss of 
ancestral land the three accused leaders of the CDF could be held criminally 
responsible. 
 
  
At the epistemological level, Hoffman took issue with Colonel Iron’s 
representation of the civil war in Sierra Leone: 
 
 
WITNESS: The theoretical point that’s made in the report is that, 
what I would think of, is a kind of universalism. This claim that 
understanding any particular violent conflict, any war, allows you to 
understand any other war. There’s a claim made that warfare is so 
distinct from every other social aspect of life, that any war – any one 
war has more in common with another war than it does with anything 
else, any other dynamic. And that troubles me greatly because it 
simply – what it ends up doing is it completely erases history. It 
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completely erases culture, politics. It sort of – the implicit claim there, 
it is not that implicit, it’s fairly explicit, is that these factors don’t 
matter. That if you understand, for example, the Polish resistance to 
World War II, you know everything you need to know about the 
conflict in Rwanda or Sierra Leone. That, to me, I would take issue 
with that (SCSL 2006a: 111-112). 
 
 
Hoffman’s insistence on the specificities of the civil war in Sierra Leone 
reflects cultural anthropology’s relativist and historical perspective. From his 
perspective, Colonel Iron’s report ‘exemplifies the conventional wisdom 
about post-Cold War violence and the discourses by which it is understood’ 
(Hoffman 2007: 641). Through this statement shines Hoffman’s concerns 
about the popularity of humanitarian and military interventions in Africa, 
which are based on a flawed understanding of violent conflicts in Africa and 
their underlying causes. 
 
 
In the trial against three leaders of the AFRC, Thorsen expressed similar 
concerns in her report and the evidence she gave in court on 24 and 25 
October 2006. She criticized Bangura’s report because, from her perspective, 
it simplified multi-faceted social practises and represented women as victims 
without agency. By drawing on feminist and anthropological scholarship 
Thorsen argued that women employed a range of strategies to create ‘room 
for manoeuvre’ in the context of ‘arranged marriages’.  She then applied this 
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argument to strategies of girls and women in African violent conflicts. 
Drawing on the sociological concept of agency and the anthropological 
literature she argued that even in war women were active agents, not merely 
passive victims (Thorsen 2006). 
 
 
Whilst advancing a similar critique of the prosecution experts’ reports 
Hoffman and Thorsen adopted different approaches. Hoffman conducted a 
short study on the kamajors in April 2006 but, unlike Iron who only spent 
about two weeks in the country, he was able to draw on his considerable 
research experience and long-standing relationships with former kamajors. 
He elaborated on his motives when I met him after he testified. Initially, 
Hoffman had hesitated to act as expert witness because of a strong sense of 
obligation towards his informants, all former members of the kamajors, as he 
told me after he had testified. In particular, he was concerned about his 
informants’ anonymity which he had promised to protect. He was worried 
about future access to the field if his informants felt he had betrayed their 
trust. Eventually, he decided to write the report because he felt that Iron’s 
report grossly misrepresented the nature of the kamajor movement (cf. 
Hoffman 2007: 639-641). And at least some of the people he was talking 
about felt he achieved this goal. I observed his testimony from the public 
gallery in the courtroom in Freetown and talked to some of the members of 
the audience, many of them former kamajors. After he had given evidence in 
court they said that finally someone ‘had told the truth about the kamajors’. 
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Whilst Hoffman drew on his extensive fieldwork in Sierra Leone Thorsen’s 
role was ‘to raise some abstract questions’, as she stated under cross-
examination on 25 October 2006 (p. 5). She had been asked by one of the 
defence lawyers in the AFRC-trial to conduct ‘a short research on the concept 
of forced marriage in the West African region, of which the purpose was to 
outline the history and practice of forced marriage in the region and possibly 
also the way in which this practice is embedded in local culture and practice’ 
(Thorsen 2006: 1). Thorsen declined to carry out the requested research 
because of the problematic assumptions underlying the research questions: 
 
 
My response is founded on a deep concern with the longer-term 
consequences of making straightforward links between complex 
social practises of arranging marriages between kin groups, 
international conceptualisations of “forced marriages”, and the 
coercion of women into being “bush wives” during the civil war in 
Sierra Leone. Not only does such a simplification deny women – and 
young women in particular – agency in decisions related to their own 
or their daughters’ marriage, it also describes social practises as static 
and unresponsive to processes of economic, social and political 
change.  
Most importantly, I am worried that the requested research 
with its focus on ‘forced marriage’ in West Africa endorses a general 
view on rural populations as backwards and on their diverse social 
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practises as the primary source of malevolence, sexual abuse, and war 
atrocities (Thorsen 2006: 1). 
 
 
Instead, she wrote a critical analysis of the problematic concepts of forced 
marriage and female agency in West Africa drawing on the anthropological 
literature and her own fieldwork on gender relations in rural Burkina Faso. 
When I interviewed Thorsen in June 2011 she told me that, from her 
perspective, her main task had been to educate the court by problematizing 
the concept of ‘forced marriage’ as it was employed by the prosecution. 
rather than providing facts or a different interpretation of facts since she 
fieldwork experience in Sierra Leone. She was at pains to point out that the 
category of forced marriage is too simplistic to account for girls’ and 
women’s agency even during armed conflict. Although the defence had 
initially expected her to visit Sierra Leone for a short research in preparation 
of writing the report they had no objections against her report and submitted 
it as evidence hoping it would undermine Bangura’s report. 
 
 
It is instructive to compare Hoffman’s and Thorsen’s approach. Hoffman 
grappled with the trust placed in him by his informants and was concerned 
about the possible long-term consequences for his access to the field. Thorsen 
did not face these ethical problems as she limited her role to a general 
critique of Bangura’s report. But unlike Hoffman her testimony was 
exclusively concerned with a critique of the abstract concept of bush wives 
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used by Bangura due to a lack of first-hand research experience in Sierra 
Leone, which adversely affected the relevance of her testimony in the eyes of 
judges of the trial chamber as the next part shows.iii  
 
 
The judges’ take on the experts’ testimony 
 
The main task of the expert is to assist the judges with his or her expertise. 
The expert reports and testimony constitute merely a fraction of all the 
evidence assessed by the judges. After weighing all the evidence submitted to 
them by the parties they decide on the guilt of the accused. Sometimes it is 
not clear to what extent the judges draw on experts’ reports and testimony of 
if they heed them at all. In some instances, judges draw explicitly on experts’ 
reports to support their findings (Rosen 1977: 561).  
 
 
In the judgement against the leaders of the CDF, the judges of trial chamber 
mentioned neither Iron’s nor Hoffman’s reports. With regard to the structure, 
origins and history of the CDF and the kamajor militia, the subject of Iron’s 
and Hoffman’s expert reports, the court relied exclusively on witnesses of 
fact called by the prosecution who confirmed the prosecution theory of 
centralized military organization led by the three accused. By doing so, the 
judges displayed a clear preference for witnesses of fact observed as well at 
the ICTR (Eltringham 2013). The appeals chamber also did not make explicit 
reference to the experts’ testimony.  
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It is noteworthy though that the legal categories employed by the judges 
mirrored those employed by Colonel Iron’s report. It appears that the 
judgement was shaped by the same categories as Iron’s report and the 
prosecution’s indictment. The notions about command responsibility, which 
had been developed in the war crimes trials after World War II had spread 
with considerable speed in the military field since the advent of peacekeeping 
in the 1990s and had influenced military doctrine as I was told by justice 
Boutet of trial chamber I, a former Canadian Judge Advocate General. Thus 
Iron’s expert report applied exactly the same categories as the judges whereas 
the anthropologist’s findings differed too much from the categories 
circulating with ease between legal and military doctrine. 
 
 
The expert testimony on forced marriage generated more discussion among 
the judges of trial chamber II as can be gleaned from the two separate 
opinions, one concurring by judge Sebutinde and one dissenting by judge 
Doherty. A judgement at the Special Court requires a majority of the judges 
but judges have the right to issue separate opinions if they want to present 
own reasoning. They also might issue a dissenting opinion if they disagree 
with the majority of the bench. Dissenting opinions are of much value to 
courtroom ethnography as they reveal at least parts of the discussion between 
the judges that is usually not made public. The question whether forced 
marriage constituted a separate crime under international criminal law was 
important because scholars and activists promoted it as a culturally sensitive 
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category explicitly recognizing the multifaceted nature of violence against 
women in war (Gong-Gershowitz 2009; Slater 2012). 
 
The judgement discussed the question whether forced marriage constitutes a 
separate crime combining elements of sexual and non-sexual violence, the 
view held by the prosecution, in some detail (SCSL 2007a: §§701-714, pp. 
216-221). By majority decision, the judges rejected the prosecution’s 
submission and ruled that forced marriage was not a separate crime but, in 
fact, constituted a form of sexual slavery. As a consequence, they dismissed 
the charge as redundant (SCSL 2007a: §713, pp. 220). In their motivation, 
the judges did not explicitly draw on the expert witnesses. They merely 
concluded that ‘having now examined the whole of the evidence in the case, 
the Trial Chamber by a majority, is not satisfied that the evidence adduced by 
the Prosecution is capable of establishing the elements of a non-sexual crime 
of “forced marriage” independent of the crime of sexual slavery under article 
2(g) of the Statute’ (SCSL 2007a: §704, p. 217).  
 
 
The two separate opinions, one concurring and one dissenting, provide much 
more valuable information on the role played by the experts in the judges’ 
reasoning. Justice Sebutinde’s separate concurring opinion found ‘Dr. 
Thorsen’s report and evidence of little relevance to the issue at hand given 
the fact that she declined to write on the topic requested of her by the 
Defence’ (Sebutinde 2007: §1, p. 574).  
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Justice Sebutinde only referred to Thorsen’s testimony when she 
distinguished ‘arranged or inheritance marriages’ from the abduction and 
abuse of women as bush-wives during the civil war in Sierra Leone. During 
cross-examination, Thorsen had indeed made that distinction but immediately 
questioned the underlying assumption that all women who became bush-
wives during the civil war were abducted. Instead, she raised the possibility 
‘that some might have gone into it on their own free will but young women 
also had stakes in getting married’ (SCSL 2006b: 4). Thorsen insisted on 
raising fundamental methodological and epistemological questions about the 
Eurocentric and universalistic categories in international law, which formed 
the prosecution expert’s framework. In her view, these were not categories of 
social-scientific study but constituted rather normative and simplistic 
categories employed from a ‘rights-based perspective’ (Thorsen 2006: 4).  
 
 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Doherty argued against the other two judges 
that forced marriage is not synonymous with sexual slavery and held that it 
indeed constituted a separate crime as ‘other inhumane act’ combining sexual 
and non-sexual elements stemming from the woman being ‘forced into a 
relationship of a conjugal nature with the perpetrator thereby subsuming the 
victim’s will and undermining the victim’s exercise of the right to self-
determination’ (Doherty 2007: §69, p. 595).  
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Both, justice Sebutinde and justice Doherty, relied heavily on Bangura’s 
report and testimony, although they drew different legal conclusions. Unlike 
Thorsen’s report they found Bangura’s testimony ‘relevant and very 
instructive on the subject of forced “marriage” within the Sierra Leone 
Conflict’ (Sebutinde 2007: §11, pp. 577-578). They explicitly approved of 
Bangura’s methodology. Justice Sebutinde, for instance, approvingly referred 
to ‘in-depth interviews of over 100 former victims of “forced marriage”’ 
conducted by Bangura (Sebutinde 2007: §11, fn. 11, p. 578). In the final 
judgement, the judges of the Appeals Chamber overturned the trial chambers 
decision and explicitly recognized forced marriage as a separate crime 
against humanity. They quoted Bangura’s report at length to support their 
view of forced marriage involving ‘a perpetrator compelling a person by 
force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or 
those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with another 
person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the 
part of the victim’ (2008c: §195, p. 64). 
 
 
The victims’ agency was not an issue for the judges. According to justice 
Doherty, forced marriage prevented the women to exercise their ‘right of 
self-determination’ (Doherty 2007: §69, p. 595). None of them allowed for 
the possibility that some women might actually choose to become ‘bush 
wives’, as Thorsen had suggested in her testimony. Even testimony of factual 
witnesses supporting Thorsen’s arguments was discounted by the judges. One 
of the witnesses, TF1-023,iv testified that she was not forced to do any work 
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and that she was respected as the wife of a rebel commander but, according 
to Doherty, ‘this in no way diminishes the seriousness of the acts committed 
against the witness’ (Doherty 2007: §41, p. 589). The explicit rejection of 
Thorsen’s testimony illustrates the judges’ refusal to consider ‘abstract 
questions’ (SCSL 2006b: 5). They also did not share her concerns about the 
‘lack of contextualisation’ (SCSL 2006b: 6) and methodological 
shortcomings in Bangura’s report.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The anthropologists’ critique of Western military and activist concepts did 
not have a tangible influence on the judges who found the prosecution 
experts’ testimony more useful. Hoffman’s and Thorsen’s experience 
resonates with the experience of anthropologists testifying in indigenous 
rights claims where the judges and jurors rejected the anthropologists’ call 
for the recognition of cultural difference  (Campisi 1991; Clifford 1988; 
Paine 1996). 
 
 
In the light of the strategies employed by the prosecution and the defence it is 
important to remember that both anthropologists testified for the defence. 
They were employed to cast doubt on the reports of the prosecution experts 
but in doing so they also sought to raise fundamental questions about the 
applicability of universalistic military and legal categories to the messy 
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realities of everyday practices in West Africa. It seems the arguments 
advanced by the anthropologists suited much better the defence case. This 
observation should by no means imply that anthropologists invariably act as 
experts for the defence. In fact, anthropologists have testified as prosecution 
experts in international criminal trials (Eltringham 2013) and Rosen (1977: 
564) reminds us that anthropologists can appear on both sides in a trial. This 
article rather shows how Hoffman’s and Thorsen’s critique of abstract, 
universalistic legal categories and their call for nuanced thick descriptions of 
ambivalent everyday experiences served the defence argument much better. 
Of course, these arguments are not the exclusive domain of anthropologists 
even though anthropologists are more likely and better equipped to raise 
them. The defence had insisted on contextualising the criminal acts 
throughout, attempting to undermine the prosecution case of clear-cut 
criminal responsibility because of command responsibility or joint criminal 
enterprise. In the end, they failed to convince the judges of their cases. Both 
trial chambers and the Appeal Chamber found the accused guilty and 
sentenced them to long prison sentences.v 
 
 
Testifying for the defence of men charged with the most heinous crimes who 
are subsequently found guilty highlights the professional, ethical and political 
dilemmas faced by Hoffman and Thorsen. Hoffman was acutely aware of this 
and felt he had to correct what from his perspective were misrepresentations 
of the kamajors. Thorsen did not want to downplay the prevalence of sexual 
violence against women during the civil war in Sierra Leone when she 
  40 
attempted to ‘educate the court’ about the problematic category of forced 
marriage. In line with the definition of expert witness, Thorsen saw her task 
primarily as assisting the judges. Many anthropologists, however, might have 
serious ethical and political concerns if they would be asked to testify for the 
defence of those accused of the most heinous crimes. They might also be 
concerned to jeopardize their career or reputation.  
 
 
It should be noted that Hoffman and Thorsen submitted their reports after the 
prosecution had concluded its case, more than two years after the beginning 
of the trials in 2004. Their anthropological expertise might have better 
employed at a much earlier stage, during the investigation and pre-trial 
phases when prosecutors and judges as well as defence lawyers could have 
benefited from an anthropological perspective on modes of social 
organisation and marriage practices in Sierra Leone. 
 
 
Bearing also in mind Rosen’s (1977), Good’s (2004) and Wilson’s (2011) 
call to understand better the role played by experts in court Hoffman’s and 
Thorsen’s experience are instructive for anthropologists who are asked to act 
as experts in international criminal trials. The judges’ refusal to address the 
arguments raised by the anthropologists highlights their reluctance to 
question the universalistic assumptions undergirding abstract legal categories. 
It also bears testimony to the judges’ faith in the experts’ ability to get the 
facts right and feed them into legal fact-finding. This reluctance is 
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understandable as the anthropologists voiced doubts about the very 
foundations the project of international criminal justice is built on, 
universality of legal rules and the possibility of establishing facts in a cross-
cultural context. The judges’ preference for the testimony of Bangura also 
illustrates the odds faced by anthropologists who aim to expose conceptual 
and methodological flaws of experts who seem ‘to know what they are 
talking about’ (Collins and Evans 2007: 113). The analysis presented in this 
article shows that demarcation of contested expertise is always contingent 
and that a reflective approach exploring the boundaries between expertise and 
law as well as the multifarious ways in which they influence each other 
continues to be highly relevant to social anthropology and beyond (cf. 
Jasanoff 2003).  
 
 
As a consequence, anthropologists in international criminal trials might want 
to avoid advancing a fundamental epistemological and methodological 
critique of other bodies of expert knowledge and instead emphasise their role 
as country specialists and suppliers of factual information. They also will 
have to weigh the pros and cons of entering an adversarial trial in which they 
will testify for one of the parties. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i These were the trial against the leaders of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) 
(March 2004 – August 2007), the trial against three leaders of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (June 2004 – February 2009), and the trial 
against three leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
(March 2005 - June 2007). 
ii I.e. not open to the public with transcripts and identity of the witness is kept 
confidential. 
iii Thorsen’s lack of ethnographic data from Sierra Leone does not imply that 
she was wrong. A recent article by Ferme (2013) presenting ethnographic 
evidence on the problematic nature of the categories of ‘bush wive’ and 
forced marriage in Sierra Leone lends support to Thorsen’s arguments.  
iv Most witnesses of fact testified under witness protection measures behind a 
screen, not visible to the public, and only identified by the numbers assigned 
by the court. 
v The trial against three leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) was concluded in June 2007 when the three accused were found 
guilty and sentenced to prison sentences of respectively 45, 55 and 55 years. 
The judgement was confirmed by the Appeal Chamber in late 2007. The trial 
against the leaders of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) was concluded in 
August 2007. The two remaining accused were found guilty and sentenced to 
respectively seven and eight years. The trial chamber’s judgement was 
overturned in June 2008 by the appeals chamber which raised the sentences 
to fifteen years and twenty years respectively. 
